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597 
PUBLIC FINANCING FOR NON-PARTISAN JUDICIAL 
CAMPAIGNS: PROTECTING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 
WHILE ENSURING JUDICIAL IMPARTIALITY 
Phyllis Williams Kotey∗ 
“Judges need to be intimidated. . . .”  Tom DeLay, House Majority 
Leader1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The selection of state court judges in the United States has been the 
subject of vigorous debate.2 The controversy continues to build as some 
scholars contend that only the appointment of judges ensures the 
independence of the judiciary by insulating the judge from retaliation for 
unpopular decisions.3  Yet volumes of evidence unfold each day to 
 
∗ Senior Judge and Clinical Associate Professor of Law, Florida International University College of 
Law.  I would like to thank my colleague Thomas E. Baker for the benefit of his wisdom and vast 
knowledge as I prepared to write this article.  I would also like to thank linda f. harrison (lowercase 
preferred) of Nova Southeastern University Shepard Broad Law Center for her comments, criticisms 
and encouragement. 
 1. In 1997, Tom Delay, then Majority Whip,  introduced legislation to limit the terms of 
federal judges and to restrict their review in death penalty and voter referendum cases, asserting that 
Article II of the United States Constitution gives Congress appellate jurisdiction.  DeLay announced 
to a group of reporters that, “Judges need to be intimidated. . . .” In a speech about judicial 
independence on February 1, 2001, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg responded to Delay’s comment 
calling him an exterminator.  Justice Ginsburg said columnist Bob Herbert of the Washington Post 
got it right when he said in a December 2000 column that, “[a]n intimidated judge is a worthless 
judge.”  See Deborah Kristensen, In Search of Judicial Independence, 46 JUN ADVOCATE (Idaho) 27 
(2003). 
2 See, e.g., JEFFREY M. SHAMAN ET AL, JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHICS (Matthew Bender, ed., 
Lexis Law Publishing 2000); STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CONFIRMATION MESS: CLEANING UP THE 
FEDERAL APPOINTMENT PROCESS (Basic Books 1994); CHARLES H. SHELDON AND LINDA H. 
MAULE, CHOOSING JUSTICE: THE RECRUITMENT OF STATE AND FEDERAL JUDGES (Washington 
State University Press 1997); ROSCOE POUND FOUNDATION & YALE LAW SCHOOL, PRESERVING 
THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY: THE DUAL CHALLENGE OF DEMOCRACY AND THE BUDGET 
CRISIS: REPORT OF THE 1993 FORUM FOR STATE COURT JUDGES (Barbara Wolfson ed., 1994) 
 3. Steven Zeidman, To Elect or Not to Elect: A Case Study of Judicial Selection in New York 
1
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reveal a judiciary under attack for making legal albeit unpopular 
decisions.4 While the cloak of a lifetime appointment with no effective 
method of removal does little to instill confidence in the impartiality of 
the judiciary, an election riddled with partisan rhetoric or one-sided 
attacks is no panacea for instilling trust.5  This state of affairs can be best 
described as “learning to live within the cesspool that has been created”6 
in a system that requires judges to stand for election, yet avoid the 
improprieties of campaign misconduct. 
The different methods utilized throughout the country for selecting 
state court judges have produced a myriad of commentaries and 
criticisms that range from assertions that the appointment process 
diminishes the judiciary’s accountability to the people, to admonitions 
that judicial elections put “justice for sale.”7  The overriding 
consideration in this debate continues to be that preserving judicial 
impartiality and promoting judicial independence are invaluable 
components of our judicial system.  However, the threat to judicial 
independence continues as more judges become political targets of 
legislators seeking to impeach them in response to their court decisions.8  
Even though the pull of the lever at the voting machine offers no greater 
protection to judges who serve at the will of the vote of the majority, it is 
the preservation of the right to vote, not the partisan outcries, that 
becomes the more compelling reason for electing judges. 
Judicial independence is a valuable component of the American 
system of justice.  This article posits that partisan judicial elections, 
funded from the coffers of lawyers, special interests groups and political 
parties,9 cannot effectively build confidence in the impartiality or 
 
City 1977-2000, 37 U. MICH. J.L.REFORM 791, 818 (2004). 
 4. Penny White, It’s a Wonderful Life, or Is It? America Without Judicial Independence, 27 
U. MEM. L. REV. 1, 8 (1996). 
 5. See Paul D. Carrington, Judicial Independence and Democratic Accountability in Highest 
State Courts, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 79, 112 (1998). 
 6. This phrase was coined from a discussion with Justice Michael Keasler of the Texas 
Criminal Court of Appeal on October 25, 2004 at the National Judicial College in Reno, Nevada.  
Justice Keasler opined that given the reality that judges are selected by election, the challenge for 
judges is to avoid ethical violations while striving to be elected by “learning to live within the 
cesspool that has been created.” 
 7. See Deborah Goldberg, Public Funding of Judicial Elections: The Roles of Judges and the 
Rules of Campaign Finance, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 95, 95 (2003). 
 8. White, supra note 4, at 2. 
 9. Deborah Goldberg & Craig Holman, The New Politics of Judicial Elections: How 2000 
Was a Watershed Year for Big Money, Special Interest Pressure, and TV Advertising in State 
Supreme Court Campaigns 11 (2002).  Some analyses suggest that at least one-half of all donations 
to judges come from lawyers and business interests.  Id.  Political parties rank third.  Id. 
2
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independence of the judiciary.10 In addition, political appointments, by 
their very nature, act as forums for consideration of political, not 
judicial, qualifications.11 Therefore, if judges are to be placed before the 
public for a vote, public funded nonpartisan elections offer the public the 
best protection from the improper influence of money thereby instilling 
the virtues of impartiality and independence. 
II.  METHODS FOR SELECTION OF STATE COURT JUDGES 
A.  The History 
The appointment process as a preferred method for selecting judges 
is embedded in the history of our country.12 Alexander Hamilton wrote, 
“[t]he complete independence of the courts of justice is peculiarly 
essential in a limited Constitution.”13  The Framers of this limited 
constitutional form of government designed a judicial branch to 
independently decide questions of law shielded from the undue influence 
of the other branches of government.  This permanent appointment of 
judges with a standard of good behavior for continuance in office was a 
“barrier to the encroachments and oppressions of the representative 
body.”14  It was obviously anticipated that such encroachments and 
oppressions—in response to unpopular rulings by a court—would 
eventually affect the decisional process of judges compromising both 
impartiality and independence. 
The historical significance of the origin of our country and its break 
from colonization certainly influenced the Framers of our Constitution.  
The original colonies failed to insulate the judiciary; instead choosing to 
have judicial power subject to influences from the executive and 
 
 10. J. Clark Kelso, Judicial Elections: Practices and Trends, Institute for Legislative Practice, 
McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific, (1999)  at http://www.mcgeorge.edu/ 
government_law_and_policy/publications/ccglp_pubs_mje_judicial_elections.htm (last visited Mar. 
24, 2005).  Candidates, lawyers who appear regularly in court and persons organizations are the 
people most interested in judicial elections.  Id. People generally contribute to a campaign with the 
expectation of receiving something in return.  Id. 
 11. Elizabeth A. Larkin, Judicial Selection Methods: Judicial Independence and Popular 
Democracy, 79 DENV. U.L. REV. 65, 72-3 (2002). 
 12. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), THE FEDERALIST: A COLLECTION OF 
ESSAYS BY ALEXANDER HAMILTON, JOHN JAY AND JAMES MADISON, INTERPRETING THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE U.S. AS AGREED UPON BY THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, SEPTEMBER 17, 1787 
(Wiley Book Company, 1901). 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
3
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legislative branches of government.15  In the Articles of Confederation, 
judges had limited jurisdiction with a guarantee of neither salary nor 
longevity.16 Congress, not the courts, had final appellate authority in all 
disputes and differences, thus creating “the phenomenon of legislative 
courts.”17 This occurrence was in direct contradiction of the Separation 
of Powers Doctrine that gave the courts, not Congress, appellate 
authority.18 
Shaped by the philosophical position of our Founding Fathers, our 
present federal system of judicial selection began to take form.19  Federal 
judges are appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the 
Senate.20  A chief complaint articulated in the Declaration of 
Independence was that “he [King George III] has made judges 
dependent on his will alone, for tenure of their offices, and the amount 
and payment of their salaries.”21  Therefore, both salary and longevity 
were addressed in recognition of the need for both factors to preserve 
independence and ensure impartiality.  With salaries that could not be 
reduced and life tenure, judicial independence and impartiality were 
institutionalized in our federal system of government.22 
These changes in the judicial branch of our government did not 
ensure a change in the attitude of the Federalist.  The legislature wielded 
enormous power and in fact, many significant constitutional 
controversies of the period that marked the beginning of our 
constitutional form of government were resolved in the legislative and 
executive branches.23  The judiciary remained as an apparent uneven 
 
 15. ROSCOE POUND, ORGANIZATION OF COURTS 64-67 (Little, Brown & Co. 1940). 
 16. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, art. IX (repealed in 1789). The jurisdiction of judges was 
limited to trials of piracies and felonies committed on high seas and appeals in capture cases. Id. In 
fact, legislative action was necessary for the enforcement of judgments.  Id. In addition, judges did 
not have the protection of guaranteed salaries or life tenure.  Id. 
 17. Edwin H. Greenbaum & W. Williard Wirtz, Separation of Powers: The Phenomenon of 
Legislative Courts, 42 IND. L.J. 153,  153-55 (1967). 
 18. Id. at 154-55. 
 19. The fight to establish judicial independence was also waged in England before the 
American Revolution when King James I established prerogative courts.  See Archibald Cox, The 
Independence of the Judiciary: History and Purposes, 21 U. DAYTON L. REV. 565, 568 (1996). 
 20. U.S. CONST. art. II, §2. 
 21. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 11 (U.S. 1776).  Hamilton, in the Federalist 
No. 79, observed the need for a guarantee of judicial independence noting that “[A] power over a 
man’s subsistence amounts to power over his will.” Hamilton, supra note 12. 
 22. See Cox, supra note 19, at 572. 
 23. David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: The Most Endangered Branch, 1801-
1805, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 219, 220 (1998).  The Louisiana Purchase, the Burr Conspiracy, 
the War of 1812, the Cumberland Road, the Missouri Compromise and the Monroe Doctrine were 
all controversies that were fought and decided in the legislative and executive branches.  Id. 
4
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appendage in the three branches of government.  The ability of the 
courts to conduct review of legislation became the subject of debate that, 
once resolved by the courts, began to elevate the courts to the level of 
the other two branches of government.24 
Historically, the federal method of judicial selection was perceived 
as a guarantee of judicial independence because judges were insulated 
from the threat of removal and did not rely on popular approval.  The 
congressional attempt at impeaching the judiciary25 is evidence that both 
the past and the present are replete with political attacks on judicial 
independence.  The stakes are high in a process that results in a 
permanent position, and the results are only as good as the gatekeepers 
that allow others to enter.26 
B.  The Appointment Process 
The appointment process has been coined “merit selection” because 
it is believed to produce the most qualified and meritorious candidate 
through the vetting process.27 A key feature of the appointment process 
that is believed to render the judicial selection process nearly impervious 
to political influence is the use of a nominating commission.28  This 
nominating commission plays an integral role in the screening and 
recommendation of judicial candidates to a separate body that makes the 
actual appointment from a list of recommended candidates.29 
Depending upon the state, the appointment is made by the 
legislature,30 the governor31 and in the rarer cases, by the judiciary.32 In 
California, Maine, and New Jersey the governor appoints judges without 
a nominating commission, but subject to the confirmation of the 
senate.33  As meritorious as it may be to some scholars to use the 
 
 24. See, e.g,. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
 25. The Marbury v. Madison decision sparked a fierce attempt by the Jeffersonians to 
impeach the “Federalist” judges who “impermissibly” extended their power of judicial review. See 
Cox,  supra  note 19, at 575.  The judges were appointed for their “lifetime” to the federal bench as 
the Federalists lost power.  See Marbury, 5 U.S. at 137-38. 
 26. Harold See, Comment: Judicial Selection and Decisional Independence, 61 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 141, 142 (1998). 
 27. Zeidman, supra note 3, at 834. 
 28. Id. at 831. 
 29. Id. at 832. 
 30. American Judicature Society (AJS), Judicial Selction Methods in the States at 
http://www.ajs.org/selection/sel_state-select-map.asp  (last visited Mar. 24, 2005). 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. The legislature in Virginia appoints all judges, the judiciary appoints its own in 
Hawaii.  Id. 
 33. Zeidman, supra note 3, at 834. 
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appointment process (merit selection) for the selection of state court 
judges, the fact remains that in all but eleven of our fifty states, judges 
must face a popular vote to retain or win their seat.34  It is doubtful that 
the general public will voluntarily give up the right to elect its judges. 
C.  The Election Process 
Historically, elections were seen as the answer to breaking 
landowner control of the judiciary.  Judges viewed elections as an 
opportunity to unite popular support to counter legislative and executive 
power.35  Judicial elections are generally uncontested, but are becoming 
the subject of controversy and litigation as candidates employ traditional 
political tactics in an arena that is anything but traditional.36  Some form 
of an election is used in a majority of the states to elect judges.  In fact, 
judges at some level face election in thirty-nine states.37  In eight states 
partisan elections are held to select judges serving in the state’s highest 
court.38  These are the courts of last resort (for an appeal in the state 
court system) and the justices must conduct a partisan election to obtain 
and retain a seat on the court.39  In the absence of public campaign 
financing, justices face the prospect of soliciting, accepting and utilizing 
funds from lawyers and litigates who may have appeared or might 
appear before the court.40  The limits of both independence and 
impartiality are severely stretched in the process. 
In thirteen states, judges sitting at the highest level of the state court 
are elected in nonpartisan elections.41  The judges in these nonpartisan 
 
 34. See Bradley A. Smith, Symposium on Judicial Elections: Selecting Judges in the 21st 
Century, 30 CAP. U.L. REV. 437, 437 (2002). 
 35. Philip L. Dubois, Accountability, Independence and the Selection of State Judges: The 
Role of Popular Elections, 40 SW. L.J. 31, 35 (1986). 
 36. See, e.g., Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 768 (2002); Weaver v. 
Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312, 1315-18 (11th Cir. 2002); Spargo v. New York State Comm’n on Judicial 
Conduct, 351 F.3d 65, 67-74 (N.D. N.Y. 2003). 
 37. Smith, supra note 34, at 437.  The number includes thirteen states that employ a form of 
partisan election for at least some of their judges and seventeen states that employ some form of 
non-partisan election.  AJS, supra note 30. 
 38. AJS, supra note 30.  In Alabama, Illinois, Louisiana, Michigan, Ohio, Pennsylvania, 
Texas and West Virginia, judges are elected to the state’s highest court in partisan elections.  Id.  
Judges run under and are identified by political party labels.  Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. See Pamela Willis Baschab, Putting the Cash Cow Out to Pasture: A Call to Arms for 
Campaign Finance Reform in the Alabama Judiciary, 30 CUMB. L. REV. 11, 20-21 (2000).  Some 
judges have resigned rather than face the minefield of the current elective process.  Id. at 20. 
 41. AJS, supra note 30. These states are Arkansas, Georgia, Idaho, Kentucky, Minnesota, 
Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, Washington and Wisconsin.  
Id. 
6
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elections also face the prospect of soliciting, accepting, and utilizing 
funds from those who appeared or may have appeared before the court.42 
Given the pervasiveness of judicial elections, it is doubtful that 
citizens will easily abandon the right to select or retain judges by ballot.  
Therefore, the key is to develop a system that minimizes improper 
political influences. 
III.  PRACTICES FOR THE SELECTION OF JUDGES IN SELECTED STATES 
A.  Tennessee 
An oft-cited example to support the elimination of judicial elections 
for state court judges is the case of former Tennessee Supreme Court 
Justice Penny White.  In Tennessee, there are five justices on the 
Supreme Court.43  The justices are appointed through a nominating 
commission.44  Two intermediate appellate courts of equal jurisdiction, 
the Court of Appeals and the Criminal Court of Appeals, are also 
selected through a nominating commission.45  After the justices are 
appointed, they must stand for a retention election in the next biennial 
general election. 46  Thereafter, they face retention elections every eight 
years.47 
Justice White was appointed to the Supreme Court in January 
1995.48 In June 1996, she participated in a three-two decision that 
resulted in the reversal of a death penalty case.49  Two months later, 
Justice White was the only Supreme Court justice facing a retention 
election.50 The Governor denounced the death penalty decision and 
labeled Justice White as “a judge soft on the death penalty and weak on 
victim rights.”51  In a campaign led by a special interest group using 
misleading and inaccurate information, Justice White was defeated.52  
 
 42. Baschab, supra  note 40, at 20-21. 
 43. AJS, supra note 30. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Gerald F. Uelmen, Crocodiles in the Bathtub: Maintaining the Independence of State 
Supreme Courts in an Era of Judicial Politicization, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1133, 1133 (1997). 
 49. Tennessee v. Odum, 928 S.W.2d 18, 33 (Tenn. 1996). 
 50. Uelmen, supra note 48, at 1133. 
 51. Id. 
 52. See, e.g., John Gibeaut, Taking Aim, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1996, at 50, 53 (1996). Reportedly, 
only nineteen percent of the voters participated in this vote and Justice White was removed after 
obtaining about forty-four precent of a retention vote.  Id. 
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The timing of the campaign left little time for Justice White to mount a 
response and the voters were  given little other information with which 
to judge her performance as a judge except for the barrage of 
information from the special interest group aimed at unseating her.53  
After the campaign to unseat Justice White was successful, Tennessee’s 
governor remarked, “Should a judge look over his shoulder to the next 
election in determining how to rule on a case?  I hope so. I hope so.”54 
Not all of the citizens of Tennessee were proud of the success of the 
campaign to unseat Justice White.  Subsequently, sparked by the fear of 
a repeat occurrence in the 1998 election, the Tennessee Bar Association, 
the League of Women Voters and other groups in Tennessee joined 
forces to promote a public awareness program about the importance of 
judicial elections and the need for evaluation of a judge’s complete 
record.55  The public responded to the call to learn more about the judges 
before voting and accessed the information the Bar Association made 
available in record numbers.56 
B.  Texas 
In no other state is the call for judicial reform more pronounced 
than in the State of Texas.57  All Texas judges are elected in partisan 
elections and must run for re-election every six years.58  There are two 
appellate level courts at the highest level of the state - the Texas 
Supreme Court and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals.59  The 
 
 53. Id. In the same year, a member of the Nebraska Supreme Court authored a unanimous 
decision that found unconstitutional a term limit initiative that failed to have the required number of 
signatures to qualify.  Uelmen, supra note 48, at 1134.  The sponsors of the initiative led a well 
financed campaign that led to his removal from the bench in the next election.  Id. 
 54. Breaking the Most Vulnerable Branch: Do Rising Threats to Judicial Independence 
Preclude Due Process in Capital Cases?, 31 COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV. 123, 140 (1999) 
(edited transcription of panel discussion during ABA Annual Meeting on August 9, 1999, comments 
of Penny White). 
 55. Alfred P. Carlton, Jr., Individual States Tackle Issues of Judicial Independence as ABA 
Offers Support at http://www.abanet.org/media/carltonstates.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2005). 
 56. Id. The Bar Association reported receiving hundreds of calls for information on the judges 
and judicial elections.  Id. 
 57. Judicial Selection in the States (Texas) at http://www.ajs.org/js/TX_elections.htm  (last 
visited Mar. 24, 2005). Prompted by the impropriety or appearance of impropriety of judges 
soliciting campaign funds from those who appear and practice before them, the question of whether 
justice is for sale in Texas is the subject of numerous newspaper articles, magazines and news 
segments.  Id.  60 Minutes aired stories in 1987 and 1998 and Frontline aired a similar story in 
1999.  Id. 
 58. AJS, supra note 30.  District Court judges must stand for re-election in a partisan race 
every four years.  Id. 
 59. Id. 
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Supreme Court and the Court of Criminal Appeals are courts of final 
review at the highest level.  Judicial authority is separated with civil 
review in the Supreme Court and most criminal review in the Court of 
Criminal Appeals.60  The intermediate appellate courts have jurisdiction 
over most criminal convictions and the Court of Criminal Appeals has 
discretionary power to review these decisions.61 While the Supreme 
Court has rule-making authority, the Court of Criminal Appeals does 
not.62 
As a result of this specialization in criminal cases, Texas Court of 
Criminal Appeals Justices can become lightening rods for controversial 
decisions.63  In 1994, as a result of the only death penalty case that was 
reversed in 1993, the Republican Party led a campaign to “take over” the 
Court of Criminal Appeals and the voters responded.64  Partisan and 
special interest groups can partner to control elections because of the 
financial war chest that they possess.65  Even if no connection exists, the 
Texas voter perceives that there is a connection between campaign 
contributions and judicial decisions.66  Although no direct correlation 
has been made, from 1985 to 1995 the affirmance rate for death penalty 
cases rose from 86% to 96%.67 
As judicial elections are not likely to go away in Texas, efforts to 
reform or improve the system have been aimed at election conduct.68  A 
bill was passed and signed into law by the governor in 2001 requiring 
judicial candidates to file biographical information regarding their 
 
 60. Uelmen, supra  note 48, at 1139. 
 61. Id. 
 62. TEX CONST. art. V, § 31. 
 63. See Uelmen, supra note 48, at 1139. A writer has coined the phrase “crocodiles in the 
bathtub” to describe the dilemma facing judges of deciding a controversial case and facing a 
reelection. Id. at 1133.  He labeled the death penalty as the “fattest crocodile.”  Id. at 1135. 
 64. Id. at 1139.  One of the justices replaced was a former prosecutor with over twelve years 
on the bench.  Id.  A lawyer promising “the death penalty for killers, greater use of the harmless 
error doctrine and sanctions for attorneys who file ‘frivolous appeals in death penalty cases’” was 
elected with just two years in the Texas bar.  Id. 
 65. Baschab, supra note 40, at 20. 
 66. Judicial Selection in the States (Texas), supra note 57. In 2002, a survey of Texas voters 
indicated that 77% of voters believed that campaign contributions to judges had a “great deal” or 
“fair amount” of influence on judges’ decisions.  Id.  In an earlier survey of judges and lawyers, 
48% of judges and 79% of lawyers believed that the influence of campaign contributions on judges 
was “fairly” or “very” significant in a 1999 poll.  Id. 
 67. Uelmen, supra note 48, at 1139. 
 68. Matthew Medina, The Constitutionality of the 2003 Revisions to Canon 3(E) of the Model 
Code of Judicial Conduct, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1072, 1072 (2004).  A survey of Texas voters 
revealed that 52% preferred judicial elections over appointment and 62% of those favored 
nonpartisan elections. Judicial Selection in the States (Texas), supra note 57. 
9
Caufield: In the Wake of White
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2005
KOTEY1.DOC 4/29/2005  10:02:09 AM 
606 AKRON LAW REVIEW [38:597 
educational and professional experience.69  The information would be 
made available on the Internet and remain available at least forty-five 
days before the election.70 
C.  Florida 
Florida successfully headed off attempts by special interests groups 
to target its Supreme Court Justices for defeat.71  Florida judges at the 
highest two tiers (Supreme Court and the District Court of Appeal) are 
selected by appointment through a nominating commission.72  They then 
run to retain their seats every six years.73 The trial court judges (circuit 
and county court) are elected in nonpartisan elections and run for 
reelection every six years.74 
Special interest groups targeted Supreme Court justices facing 
retention elections in two different election cycles.75  The Florida Bar, 
through its lawyers and judges, mounted a unified defense of the court 
that was not without some costs, even though all the justices targeted 
were retained.76  In spite of the success of these challenges to judicial 
impartiality and independence, in 2000, the majority of voters in every 
Florida county rejected a referendum to opt out of nonpartisan judicial 
elections in favor of the appointment process.77 
D.  North Carolina 
North Carolina serves as a success story in dealing with the 
dilemma of judicial elections and maintaining impartiality and 
 
 69. Judicial Selection in the States (Texas), supra note 57. The bill must be implemented by 
the secretary of state and did not include a provision that the guide be mailed.  Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Uelmen, supra  note 48, at 1140.  The state has one of the highest death penalty reversal 
rates at 52% in 1995.  Id. 
 72. AJS, supra note 30.  The governor has sole authority for all of the appointments on the 
commission and receives a recommendation (non binding) from the bar for some members.  FLA. 
CONST. art. V, § 11. 
 73. AJS, supra note 30. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Uelmen, supra note 48, at 1145.  In 1990 Justice Leander Shaw, Jr. faced a vigorous 
campaign against his retention after he authored an opinion striking down the parental consent law 
for abortions for minors.  Id.  Justice Rosemary Barkett joined Justice Shaw in this opinion and was 
also targeted in 1992 by pro-life advocates who were joined by death penalty supporters.  Id. 
 76. Id. at 1153.  Over half a million dollars were spent in a campaign to educate the voters 
about judicial elections and stress the importance of independence.  Id. 
 77. Roy A. Schotland, Financing Judicial Elections, 2000: Change and Challenge, 2001 L. 
REV. M.S.U.-D.C.L.,  849, 886-87.  No other democracy in the world selects its judges by election. 
Id. at 890. 
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independence.  In North Carolina, all judges are elected in nonpartisan 
elections to eight-year terms.78  They must run for reelection at the end 
of those terms.79  Prior to the enactment of the Judicial Campaign 
Reform Act,80 judges were elected in partisan elections in which special 
interest groups had great influence and cost of campaigning was high.81  
The Act was enacted in response to the escalating role of money and 
politics in judicial elections.82  The Act mandates full public financing in 
judicial campaigns to Supreme Court and appellate judges who agree to 
strict fundraising and spending limits.83  The public fund is financed by 
voluntary contributions from attorneys when they pay their yearly bar 
dues and from a state income tax designation that allows individuals to 
direct a payment to the fund (without affecting the individual’s tax 
liability).84  The success of this Act remains to be seen, but its passage 
marshaled the efforts of a broad coalition.85  Clearly, the desire for an 
impartial and independent judiciary provided common ground for a 
common goal.  An oversight committee of attorneys and judges was 
formed to monitor judicial elections and to respond publicly to false and 
unfair attacks from the media, public or candidates. 86 
IV.  ARGUMENTS FOR REFORM IN SELECTION OF STATE COURT JUDGES 
A.  Escalating Costs 
“[A]s with any election, campaign contributions and special interest 
 
 78. AJS, supra note 30. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Carolyn Raffensperger, When Business Funds Judicial Elections, THE ENVIRONMENTAL 
FORUM, Sept/Oct 2002, at 12.  Reportedly, special interest money spent on judicial elections 
exceeded $45 million.  Id.  This increase represented a 61% increase in two years.  Id. 
 81. See Traciel V. Reid, PAC Participation in North Carolina Supreme Court Elections, 80 
JUDICATURE 21, 29 (1996). 
 82. Raffensperger, supra note 80, at 12. 
 83. Judicial Selection in the States (North Carolina) at www.ajs.org/js/NC_elections.htm (last 
visited Mar. 24, 2005).  A coalition known as the North Carolina Voters for Clean Elections led the 
fight for reform and passage of the Judicial Campaign Reform Act.  Id.  Judges who participate can 
qualify for up to $600,000 for general elections.  Id. 
 84. Id.  There is a $600,000 limit on the amount of funds that Supreme Court candidates for 
the general election can receive.  Id.  The fund is not limited to incumbents.  Id.  In order to address 
non-participating candidates and special interest groups that try to outspend the candidate, a rescue 
fund amount of $137,000 is allowed.  Id. 
 85. Id.  The North Carolina Voters for Clean Elections list almost fifty organizations as allies 
and affiliates.  The North Carolina Voters for Clean Elections at www.democracy-
nc.org/nc/Coalitions/ncvce.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2005).  The groups cover a broad range in 
interests and issues.  Judicial Selection in the States (North Carolina), supra note 83. 
 86. Judicial Selection in the States (North Carolina), supra note 83. 
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groups can manipulate judicial elections so that meaningful public 
participation is illusory.”87  The partnership of special interest groups 
and partisan groups can have an obvious control on the selection of a 
judge since the party primaries can be closed to those who fail to yield 
large contributions.88  During the 2004 election cycle, a partisan judicial 
race set a national record in single-race judicial campaign contributions, 
with over $8.5 million raised by the two candidates.89  During the race, 
insurance companies and other corporations backed one candidate in 
hopes that his election would change the plaintiff-friendly lower courts, 
while trial lawyers heavily supported the opponent.90 
Campaigns that must be financed from funds raised by the 
candidate—albeit through a campaign committee—raise the dangers of 
actual quid pro quo arrangements or at least the appearance that the 
judge may be improperly influenced.91  The Code of Judicial Conduct is 
the body of rules that govern both judges and judicial candidates in 
elections and attempt to insulate the judge and judicial candidate by 
prohibiting personal solicitation or acceptance of campaigns funds.92  
The Code recognizes that judicial impartiality and independence and the 
perception of judicial impartiality and independence are affected by the 
(real and imagined) impact of campaign contributions.93 
A national survey94 of state judges and the public asked, “How 
much influence do you think campaign contributions made to judges 
have on their decisions?”95  Seventy-six percent of the public 
respondents indicated that they felt that campaign contributions had 
“some influence” or “a great deal of influence” on the decision of 
 
 87. Scott D. Weiner, Note, Popular Justice: State Judicial Elections and Procedural Due 
Process, 31 HARV. C.R. –C.L.L. REV. 187, 208 (1996). 
 88. Baschab, supra note 40, at 20. 
 89. Paul Hampel, Karmeier Gets Nod in Bitter Race, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 3, 
2004, at B1.  Republican County Circuit Judge Lloyd Karmeier defeated Democratic District Judge 
Gordon Maag in a hotly contested race for the open Fifth District seat on the Illinois Supreme 
Court.  Id. 
 90. Id.  See also Ryan Keith, Spending for Supreme Court Seat Renews Cry for Finance 
Reform, MERCURY NEWS (San Jose), Nov. 3, 2004.  
 91. Peter Cooke, Breakstone v. Mackenzie: In a Case Where Fear of Bias is Raised by 
Judicial Election Campaign Contributions, There Are No Clear Winners, 15 NOVA L.REV. 323, 340 
(1991). 
 92. Shaman et al., supra at note 2, at 393. 
 93. Id. at 395. 
 94. Deborah Goldberg, Public Funding of Judicial Elections: Financing Campaigns for Fair 
and Impartial Courts, (2004) at http://www.brennancenter.org/resources/ji/ji3.pdf (last visited Mar. 
24, 2005).  The National Polling Data was conducted by Greenberg Quinlan Rosner Research Inc. 
in its State Judges’ Poll conducted for Justice at Stake.  Id. 
 95. Id. 
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judges.96  Comparatively, twenty-six percent of the judicial respondents 
felt that campaign contributions had “some influence” or “a great deal of 
influence” on their decisions.97 The sentiment of the public and judiciary 
that campaign contributions influence the decision of judges has been 
replicated in states across the country.98  “Fundraising practices are a 
serious threat to judicial independence.”99 
B.  Voter Preference 
A critical question to ask is why continue to select judges in 
elections, given the grave concerns about the effect of campaign 
contributions on the perception and reality of impartiality and 
independence?100  The answer, quite simply put, is that judicial elections 
are overwhelmingly the most popular method for judicial selection.101  
Elected judges preside over a majority of cases decided in the United 
States.102  Further, some feel that appointed judges exercise 
unconstrained discretion with no regard for the majority’s will.103  
Therefore, elections have remained as a means of ensuring the 
judiciary’s accountability to the electorate.104 
“‘Merit selection’ is seen by many as a masquerade to put political 
power in the hands of the organized bar and other members of the 
elite.”105  This opinion is undoubtedly fueled by the vital role that the 
nominating commission plays in this process of selecting judges.106  The 
composition of the nominating commission is a primary deficiency in its 
 
 96. Id.  Interestingly, the public responses were almost evenly split with 36% indicating “a 
great deal of influence” and 40% indicating “some influence.”  Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. AJS, supra note 30.  The American Judicature Society compiles and maintains 
information on judicial selection in every state.  Id.  The state-by-state information contains opinion 
polls and surveys that document concern about the relationship between the decisions that a judge 
makes and the contributions received.  Id. 
 99. Erwin Chemerinsky, Preserving an Independent Judiciary: The Need for Contribution 
and Expenditure Limits in Judicial Elections, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 133, 134 (1998). 
 100. Zeidman, supra note 3, at 791. 
 101. Larkin, supra note 11, at 76.  “Approximately 82% of state appellate court judges and 
87% of state trial judges run in some type of election.”  Id.  Consistently voters have rejected 
attempts to replace elections with merit retention.  In Florida in 2000, a county by county ballot 
initiative that would have allowed each county to opt out of judicial elections in favor of merit 
selection was rejected in every county.  Schotland, supra note 77, at 886-87.  A similar ballot 
initiative in Ohio was overwhelmingly defeated in 1987.  See Carrington, supra note 5, at 106. 
 102. Schotland, supra note 77, at 890. 
 103. Larkin, supra note 11, at 77. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Carrington, supra note 5, at 106. 
 106. Zeidman, supra note 3, at 831. 
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effectiveness as a non-political body.107  The commission should not be 
partisan and should be selected from “numerous sources and by multiple 
authorities.” 108  If, in fact, the power to select judges was in the hands of 
a democratically appointed few who exercised their duty to appoint, 
without regard to political ties or affiliations, then the merit of “merit 
selection” could be obvious.  But the reality is that the partisan nature of 
some of these commission appointments can be quite obvious.109  Even 
efforts to have some diversity on the commission can be difficult to 
achieve.110 
Elections operate as a check on judicial discretion.111  Faced with a 
clear rule of law, the public has the right to expect that a judge will apply 
the law regardless of the popularity of the law or litigant.112  The failure 
of a judge to impartially apply a law that is clear, should subject her to 
the will of the majority.113 Special interest groups can play a vital role in 
financing a campaign in response to a judge’s decision, but should such 
groups be allowed to influence campaigns without any regard to the 
truth of the message?  Campaign reform with a goal of “strengthen[ing] 
the judiciary’s legitimacy by enhancing judicial independence and 
accountability”114 dictates that some regulation of special interest groups 
occurs. Regulation of the message is sure to attract constitutional 
 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Formerly, the Judicial Nominating Commission (the judicial appointing authority) in the 
state of Florida was comprised of nine members: three bar appointments, three governor 
appointments, and three selected by a majority vote by the members of the commission.  Chapter 
2001-282 amended this provision so that the governor has sole authority for appointing all nine 
members.  The Florida Bar Board of Governors recommends four appointees but the governor may 
reject the nominees and require additional nominations.  FLA. CONST. art. V, § 20, amended by FLA. 
STAT. ch. 43.291. 
 110. See Mallory v. Harkness, 895  F. Supp. 1556 (S.D. Fla. 1995)  A white male successfully 
sued after being denied membership on the commission because of the requirement that women and 
minorities constitute a certain percentage on the commission.  Id. at 1564.  The Court of Appeals 
affirmed the District Court’s ruling without opinion.  Mallory v. Harkness, 109 F.3d 771 (11th Cir. 
1997). 
 111. Larkin, supra note 11, at 77. 
 112. Pamela S. Karlan, Two Concepts of Judicial Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 535, 541 
(1999). 
 113. An example of the removal of a judge by the will of the voters, was the successful 
campaign to unseat a judge who issued a thirty-year sentence in a murder case where the two 
victims were homosexuals. See Gay Rights Groups Hail Defeat of Judge in Texas, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
4, 1992, at B20.  The judge justified his decision to impose a thirty-year sentence instead of a life 
sentence with homophobic remarks.  Id.  Although he was censured by the State Commission on the 
Code of Judicial Conduct, he remained on the bench until the voters had an opportunity to hold him 
accountable.  Id. 
 114. Larkin, supra note 11, at 84. 
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challenges that may be successful if sufficiently rooted in law.115  
Notwithstanding, regulation of the spending by a special interest group 
when that message is targeted at an individual candidate may withstand 
a constitutional challenge.116 
V.  ALTERNATIVES FOR PUBLIC FUNDING OF STATE JUDICIAL 
CAMPAIGNS 
A.  Full Funding 
The most complete and comprehensive type of campaign financing 
provides funding up to the level allowed for campaign spending.117  
Generally, the provision for “full public funding” allows or requires the 
prerequisite collection of seed money by way of “qualifying 
contributions from individuals.”118  After obtaining the specified number 
of contributors and amount of contributions, the candidate qualifies for 
funding up to the full amount of spending allowed.119  North Carolina is 
the first and only state to provide full public financing in judicial 
elections, but other states have passed bills or are considering legislation 
to fully fund judicial elections.120  The concept of providing full funding 
is not new and is utilized in non-judicial elections for some or all 
candidates in Arizona, Maine, Massachusetts, and Vermont.121  Other 
forms of full public funding include tax credits or tax refunds for 
contributions made to a candidate of choice.122 
 
 115. Goldberg, supra note 94, at 16. 
 116. See id. Such enforcement generally hinges on the use of elect and defeat to trigger the 
regulation of the expenditure, but a broader interpretation that looks at advocacy that expressly 
names a candidate or issue can be included to avoid the loophole created when the words elect and 
defeat are not used.  Id. at 14. 
 117. Goldberg, supra note 7, at 105. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id.  North Carolina requires candidates to raise $33,000 to $69,000 from at least 350 
registered voters contributing from $10 - $500 each.  Chossing Judges: Money Given in Past Races 
is Restricted, Replaced Under New Program, Money in Politics Research (2004) at 
http://www.democracy-nc.org (last visited Mar. 24, 2005)  . 
 120. Goldberg, supra note 94, at 9.  The Illinois Senate passed the Supreme Court Campaign 
Reform Act (SB 1415) in March of 2003.  American Bar Association Standing Committee on 
Judicial Independence, Public Financing of Judicial Campaigns, Feb. 2002 at www.abanet.org/jud/ 
Jud_campaign.html (last visited Jan. 4, 2005).  House Bill 2800 is in committee awaiting passage.  
Id.  Wisconsin provides partial funding and has legislation pending to provide full funding.  
Goldberg, supra  note 94, at 9. 
 121. Carrington, supra note 5, at 120. 
 122. Goldberg, supra note 94, at 9. 
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B.  Partial Funding 
Partial public funding can provide some financial relief to states 
while meeting the same goal that is met with full public funding.  States 
can creatively construct schemes for providing partial public funding of 
judicial campaigns.  One method of partial funding offers the 
contributor, instead of the candidate, a benefit for making a 
contribution.123  Even though the funding does not go directly to the 
candidate, the candidate reaps the advantage from the incentive 
contributors receive from a tax refund or credit.124  Additionally, partial 
funding can be accomplished through the use of in-kind benefits (e.g. 
printing or advertising).125  Printing and political adverting can be costly 
campaign expenditures.  Therefore, while no direct funding is provided 
with this type of assistance, “free television time is probably the most 
valuable in-kind benefit that statewide judicial candidates could 
receive.”126  The most common type of partial public campaign funding 
is the issuance of a grant or subsidy as a matching fund “tied to private 
fundraising.”127  Unlike full public funding in which candidates receive 
full funding up to the total amount allowed for spending, partial funding 
is limited to a cap that is a percentage of the spending allowed.128 
C.  Limits and Restrictions 
Customarily, a candidate who chooses to utilize public funding (full 
or partial) for campaign financing must agree to restrictions on 
contributions since no additional funds are collected after qualifying.129  
These limitations typically designate a cap on the amount of the 
contribution for participating and non-participating candidates.130  A 
campaign contribution base with more contributors of smaller amounts 
undermines the appearance and reality of an improper influence created 
by fewer contributors of larger amounts.131 
In addition to caps on campaign contributions, reporting 
requirements are instituted.132 The reporting requirements apply to 
 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Goldberg, supra note 94, at 7. 
 128. Id. at 8. 
 129. Id. at 11. 
 130. Id. at 13. 
 131. Id. at 11. 
 132. Goldberg, supra note 94, at 13. 
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contributions and expenditures for all participating candidates and any 
special interest groups that target the election or defeat of a candidate.133  
The reporting requirement for expenditures is essential for enforcement 
to activate the “trigger provision.”134 The trigger provision enables 
participating candidates to financially respond to non-participating 
candidates and special interest groups that pour large amounts of money 
into an opposition campaign.135  It removes the existing restrictions and 
limitations to allow the candidate to meet the challenge of big 
spending.136 
The enforcement of the application of reporting requirements for 
non participating candidates can be effectuated without great expense or 
inconvenience provided the deadlines for reporting become shorter as 
election time nears.137  The penalties for failure to meet reporting 
deadlines must be enforced.  Enforcement does not prevent non 
participating candidates and special interest groups from escalating 
spending at the end of the campaign, but it provides notice and triggers 
the escape of the non-participating party from the limitations and 
restrictions imposed by participating in public financing.138  The 
challenge when dealing with reporting requirements for expenditures for 
special interest groups is to develop a mechanism for identifying 
spending that is targeted at the defeat or election of a candidate.139  
Requirements that are overly broad face the prospect of a constitutional 
challenge that could be successful.140 
Strict limitations on campaign spending have been found 
unconstitutional, but a reporting requirement imposed on candidates, 
individuals and groups that make independent campaign expenditures 
was found constitutional.141  The concept of public financing for judicial 
campaigns is gaining support as judicial candidates express frustration 
trying to abide by the restrictions imposed by the Code of Judicial 
 
 133. Id. at 15. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Goldberg, supra note 94, at 15. 
 137. Id. 
 138. See Carrington, supra note 5, at 117. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). The United States Supreme Court affirmed a 
reporting requirement that was not only imposed on candidates, but also on special interest groups 
or individuals that make independent expenditures.  Id.  at 80-82.  The concept of regulating special 
interest groups’ spending will open the constitutional debate as the content of such advertisements 
becomes the issue.  See Mark Kozlowski, Regulating Interest Group Activity in Judicial Elections at 
http://www.brennancenter.org/resources/ji/ji1.pdf  (last visited Mar. 24, 2005). 
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Conduct and the law.142 
In 2002, the American Bar Association’s Standing Committee on 
Judicial Independence authored a report which specifically examined 
public financing for judicial campaigns.143  The report offered findings 
and made recommendations that are effective tools in determining how a 
system of public financing in judicial campaigns should be structured.144  
The ten findings of the committee provide a comprehensive analysis of 
the need for reform.145  These findings reveal a common thread in the 
identification and survey of the relevant issues that should be addressed 
regarding judicial elections.  The overriding consideration of the 
preservation of impartiality and independence provides a backdrop that 
emphasizes issues that have already been identified. The issues of 
escalating costs of a campaign,146 accepting contributions from those 
who appear before you,147 inadequate funds to finance a campaign,148 
targeted campaign by special interest groups,149 the appearance of 
impartiality,150 the public perception of the influence of contributions,151 
soliciting funds for a campaign,152 tapping into big money,153 and 
 
 142. A former chief justice of Texas who was voted the most competent member of the 
Supreme Court resigned to work for campaign reform in judicial elections that would “take the 
money out of judicial politics.”  Baschab, supra note 40, at 20. 
 143. American Bar Association Standing Committee on Judicial Independence, Public 
Financing of Judicial Campaigns, Feb. 2002. 
 144. Id. at 9. 
 145. See id. at 11-29. “The Commission finds that the cost of judicial campaigns is escalating.” 
Id. at 11. “The Commission finds that to cover their election costs, judges must accept funds from 
contributors many of whom may be interested in the outcomes of cases before them.” Id. at 13.  
“The Commission finds that when campaign costs exceed contributions received, judges often take 
out loans to make up the difference.” Id. at 16. “The Commission finds that organizations interested 
in the outcomes of judicial elections often initiate advertising campaigns on behalf of or in 
opposition to a candidate, independent of the candidate’s own campaign.” Id. at 17. “The 
Commission finds that when judges make decisions that favor contributors, they may be accused of 
favoritism.” Id. at 18.  “The Commission finds a pervasive public perception that campaign 
contributions influence judicial decision-making.” Id. at 20.  “The Commission finds that judges are 
uncomfortable soliciting contributions, which may discourage outstanding judicial candidates from 
seeking or remaining in judicial office.” Id. at 23.  “The Commission finds that qualified candidates 
who lack connections to wealthy contributors may be impaired in their ability to compete 
effectively for judicial office.” Id. at 25.  “The Commission finds that when judges are required to 
campaign like political branch candidates, it contributes to the inappropriate politicization of the 
judiciary.” Id. at 26.  “The Commission finds that the only significant public financing program for 
judicial campaigns implemented to date has not been adequately funded.” Id. at  29. 
 146. Id. at 9. 
 147. Cooke, supra note 91, at 340. 
 148. Weiner, supra note 87, at 196. 
 149. Baschab, supra note 40, at 20. 
 150. Id. 
 151. See Cooke, supra note 91, at 340. 
 152. Goldberg, supra note 94, at 1. 
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partisan politics,154 all play a pivotal role in generating the need for 
reform.  In response to the findings by its committee, the ABA 
recommended that states finance judicial elections with public funds to 
address the perceived impropriety of judicial candidates accepting 
private contributions from individuals and organizations with an interest 
in the outcome of cases before the judge.155   
VI.  PLAN FOR THE REFORM OF THE SELECTION OF STATE COURT 
JUDGES 
Judicial elections are different and must be recognized and 
publicized as such.156  The Code of Judicial Conduct limits judges and 
judicial candidates in a way that other elected officials are not.157  These 
limitations can create a dilemma since they are completely contradictory 
to traditional politics.158  A voter can and should demand to know where 
a traditional candidate stands on issues like crime, the death penalty and 
abortion.  But a judge who espouses a position that dictates how he will 
rule has violated one of the basic tenets of the judiciary - a judge should 
fairly and impartially apply the law.159  Therefore the fundamental focus 
of any judicial reform must focus on: 1) an impartial and independent 
election process that encourages participation by allowing the voter to 
fairly and accurately assess the qualifications of the candidate; 2) a 
funding process that minimizes the influence of money by imposing 
limitations and restrictions on contributions and expenditure of 
candidates and special interest groups; 3) a voter educational process 
that emphasizes the importance of an impartial and independent 
judiciary by providing truthful and balanced information about the 
candidates and the process; and 4) an enforcement process that monitors 
and enforces violations of regulations imposed. 
Ideally, reform should be aimed at all levels of state court judges.  
The reality is, however, that the reform necessary cannot adequately 
address all levels of state court judges because the sheer number of 
 
 153. Id. 
 154. Baschab, supra note 40, at 20. 
 155. Id. at 9. 
 156. See David B. Rottman and Roy Schotland, What Makes Judicial Elections Unique?, 34 
LOY. L.A. L.REV. 1369, 1369 (2001). 
 157. Roy Schotland, Elective Judges’ Campaign Financing: Are State Judges’ Robes the 
Emperor’s Clothes of American Democracy?, 2 J.L. & POL. 57, 85 (1985). 
 158. Cynthia Canary, Know Before You Go: A Case for Publicly Funded Voters’ Guides, 64 
OHIO ST. L. J. 81, 82 (2003). 
 159. Morial v. Judiciary Comm’n, 565 F.2d 295, 302 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 
1013 (1978). 
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judges involved would make the cost of reform prohibitive.  
Additionally, citizens are in a better position to know the local trial 
judges’ records and qualifications and to determine their impartiality and 
independence.  Presumably, a trial court judge that fails to apply the law 
impartially and independently will be subject to the authority of the 
appellate court on appeal and the will of the public at an election.160  The 
need for impartiality and independence is most critical at the appellate 
level because these judges are the most vulnerable to the reality and the 
appearance of improper influences from campaign contributions due to 
the escalating costs of these elections.161  The cost of a state supreme 
court election can climb into the millions in some cases.162  Lawyers, 
business interests and political parties rank first, second and third 
respectively as contributors in judicial campaigns.163  An apparent 
interest in gaining the influence of a judge is clear.  Hence, critical 
campaign reformation should be aimed at minimizing the influence 
caused by the campaign contributions of these three entities.  Limiting 
initial campaign reform to those judges who sit only in an appellate 
capacity will drastically reduce the cost of change because of the smaller 
number of judges at that level.164 
A.  Nonpartisan 
No method for the selection of judges can completely eliminate 
improper political influence.  Therefore the challenge is to establish 
which selection method will best promote judicial impartiality and 
protect judicial independence.  Many suggest that appointing judges is 
the best way of insulating judges from the ethical problems associated 
with running a judicial campaign.165  However, a whole new set of 
political influences occur when judges are selected through the 
appointment process.166  History suggests that appointing authorities are 
concerned not only with friendship, but also with party loyalty and 
 
 160. Karlan, supra note 112, at 541. 
 161. Holman, supra note 9, at 5. 
 162. Id. at 7.  In 2000, state supreme court candidates raised $45.6 million for their campaigns.  
Id.  The average candidate raised $430,529.  Id. at 8.  Over $1 million was raised by sixteen 
candidates.  Id. 
 163. Id. at 9.  The groups contribute more than half of all donations to judicial candidates.  Id.  
Partisan judicial races attract even more in contributions.  Id. at 5. 
 164. See Zeidman, supra note 3, at 791-92.  In the United States, there are almost 8,500 state 
trial court judges in courts of general jurisdiction while there are only over 1,200 state appellate 
court judges.  Id. 
 165. See Kelso, supra note 10. 
 166. Id. 
20
Akron Law Review, Vol. 38 [2005], Iss. 3, Art. 5
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol38/iss3/5
KOTEY1.DOC 4/29/2005  10:02:09 AM 
2005] PUBLIC FINANCING FOR NON-PARTISAN JUDICIAL CAMPAIGNS 617 
ideology.  Therefore, by its very nature, judicial selection using the 
appointment process gives the power to select a judge to an elite few and 
is undemocratic and decreases accountability.167 
Only thirteen percent of the fifty-three percent of elected state 
appellate court judges are elected in nonpartisan elections.168  
Consequently, eliminating partisan elections in favor of nonpartisan 
elections is a feasible starting point for reform.  Judges take an oath to 
fairly and impartially apply the law.  The rule of law and its fair and 
impartial application must be the benchmarks for the success of a judge.  
If judges cannot be free to fairly and impartially apply the law, then 
citizens will have no respect or trust for the impartiality or independence 
of the court’s rulings or the justice system.  Traditional candidates are 
free to offer and receive special consideration for party affiliations.169  
Judges should not be.170  The traditional link between candidates and 
special interest groups is a reality of partisan politics.  Conversely, 
animus between candidates and special interest groups is an undesirable 
reality of partisan politics.171  The foundation of impartiality and 
independence commands that judges must be different than other 
politicians.  No one should argue that impartiality and independence will 
be promoted in a judicial system in which party, friendship and kindred 
are involved.  The injection of party politics has an impact on 
impartiality and independence.172 
While it has been suggested that partisan elections serve democratic 
and constitutional principles and promote participation by ensuring 
judicial accountability, to whom is accountability ensured?173 A 
judiciary accountable to the people, not the party, must be maintained to 
promote impartiality and independence.  Unquestionably, party 
 
 167. Id. 
 168. Zeidman, supra note 3, at 791. 
 169. Baschab, supra note 40, at 19. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. From the beginning, the partisan election of judges was steeped in politics and it continues 
today. See James E. Lozier, The Missouri Plan A/K/A Merit Selection is the Best Solution for 
Selecting Michigan Judges, 75 MICH. BUS. L.J. 918, 918 (1996).  During the presidential term of 
Andrew Johnson, landowners constantly engaged in tenant disputes and needed control of the 
judges.  Id. 
 173. Studies have suggested that the method of selecting judges can be a predictor of judicial 
decisional outcome.  See F. Andrew Hanssen, Learning About Judicial Independence: Institutional 
Change in the State Courts, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 431, 434-35 (2004).  One study indicated the 
partisan judges decide case in a more partisan way.  Id. at 434.  Another study found that partisan 
judges are associated with higher tort awards.  Id. at 434-35.  A third study indicated that partisan 
judges are less likely to overturn a death penalty.  Id. at 434.  Most disturbing is the finding that 
partisan elections discourage judges from dissenting in controversial cases.  Id. 
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affiliation simplifies fundraising and voter identification, especially for 
those who contribute and vote accordingly.174  But is party identification 
a necessary and proper characteristic for ensuring impartiality and 
independence?  It is not the election, but the fundraising practices 
utilized in the election that threaten independence.175  Rather than 
abandoning judicial elections, the real solution is to support reforms that 
address the real problems of fundraising, voter education and campaign 
conduct. 
B.  Public Funding 
There have been reports that millions have been spent on judicial 
campaigns.176  No public funding system can support the full and 
unfettered contribution of total and unlimited funding; nonetheless there 
must be an answer to these escalating costs.  A candidate seeking a 
position on an appellate court or seeking to retain a position on a 
supreme court must be prepared to expend a certain amount of energy 
and effort to organize and create a base of support.  Once the base of 
support is established, however, a candidate should be able to qualify for 
public funding up to the legal amount allowed.177 Once there is a 
decision to receive public funding, the candidate agrees to abide by 
limitations on contributions, expenditures and conduct.178 
A method for qualification that requires a candidate to have a 
minimum number of contributors and amount of contributions appears to 
be equitable and take into consideration the need for a candidate to 
develop a base of support to be a viable contender.  A candidate wishing 
to do nothing other than stand for election would be seen as a frivolous 
candidate.  A wealthy candidate will always have the alternative to opt 
out of public funding, but the candidate without substantial financial 
resources would have the ability to work a grassroots campaign to 
become a viable candidate. 
The exorbitant fundraising and spending in judicial elections is not 
limited to candidates.179 Therefore the spending by special interest 
 
 174. See Ray Harding, The Case for Partisan Election of Judges, 55 A.B.A. J 1162, 1163 
(1969). 
 175. Chemerinsky, supra note 99, at 134. 
 176. Kelso, supra note 10.  In Pennsylvania where judges at all levels are selected by partisan 
elections, a Supreme Court justice spent $1.2 million in a retention campaign.  Id. 
 177. Goldberg, supra note 7, at 105. 
 178. Goldberg, supra note 94, at 11.  These limitations imposed must be carefully tailored to 
avoid constitutional impediments. See generally Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 
765 (2002); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
 179. Carlton, supra note 55, at 848. An interest group in Pennsylvania spent a significant 
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groups must be subject to the same reporting requirements.  A trigger 
provision which lifts the limitations on contributions and expenditures 
for the participating candidate is essential to address the issues of non-
participating opponents or targeted spending special interest groups.180  
Limitations on spending that raise the limit on contributions if a 
candidate participates can provide a workable way to begin to lower the 
money spent during campaigns.  These limits should be set high enough 
to encourage participation, but low enough to prevent creating an unfair 
advantage to wealthy candidates. 
C.  Voter Education 
A publicly funded voter guide must first address the fact that 
judicial elections are different.181  It should be divided into two parts.  
Part One should deal with general information on the courts, the role of 
the judge and the application of the Code of Judicial Conduct.182  A 
preamble to the guide should include a statement to the voter that an 
impartial and independent judiciary is a cherished hallmark of the justice 
system and that the guide is being sent in an attempt to preserve and 
ensure impartiality and independence during the election process.  It 
should provide a summary of the applicable Code of Judicial Conduct 
which should cover the constraints on speech, conduct and 
fundraising.183  Most importantly, the guide should contain statements 
from the candidates that acknowledge they know and will abide by these 
rules.184  These components should be a part of all voter guides for 
judicial elections.  If a candidate refuses to sign the acknowledgement, 
then that fact must be included. 
Part Two of the guide is not an essential component, but would be 
beneficial given the ballot falloff symptomatic to judicial races.185  This 
 
amount of money on judicial campaigns and became the subject of successful litigation to limit its 
spending.  Id. 
 180. Goldberg, supra  note 94, at 15. 
 181. Canary, supra note 159, at 81. 
 182. Id. at 83. 
 183. ABA Mode Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 5, provides that “[a] Judge or Judicial 
Candidate shall refrain from inappropriate political activity.”  ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL 
CONDUCT Cannon 5 (1990). This provision of the Code governs campaign conduct. See id.   
Shaman et al., supra note 2, at 366. “It should be noted. . . that no Code provision has more 
variations among the states that have adopted the Code than Canon 5.”  Id. at 366. 
 184. A public acknowledgement to abide by the rules should be an essential element in the 
guide. 
 185. Canary, supra note 159, at 86.  Voter falloff describes the tendency of voters to vote on 
the ballot items at beginning of the ballot in greater frequency than those items at the end of the 
ballot.  Id. 
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part could provide truthful information regarding the background and 
qualifications of the candidates.186  A bar or public-sponsored poll or 
evaluation that included lawyers, litigants and court personnel could be 
included and would avoid the bias label that might attach to a lawyer-
only poll.187  An alternative to the poll or evaluation could simply be the 
results of a bar interview.188  The key to this part of the guide is the 
inclusion of balanced and truthful information about the candidates to 
enable the voter to make an informed decision. 
The League of Women Voters has been a historical source of voter 
guides and voter information.189  However, the ability of a single 
organization to disseminate this information depends on the available 
resources in the community.190  Consequently, the guides may not be 
evenly distributed.  The ability to access voter guide information should 
not depend on the variance of local resources; therefore public funding 
should be used to ensure that every household get a copy of the voter 
guide. While many issue-oriented groups produce voter guides, these 
guides may be inappropriate for judicial candidates who must always be 
impartial and independent.191 
D.  Monitoring and Enforcement 
The bench and bar must take the lead in ensuring and preserving 
judicial integrity and independence.  A non-partisan, diverse, 
community-based committee comprised of the media, lawyers (sitting 
judges may be unable to ethically sit on this board), and community 
leaders should be enacted to monitor campaign conduct. This committee 
would encourage all members of the community to be monitors of 
campaign conduct.  The committee need not have enforcement power, 
but would have the power—as do all other citizens—to report violations 
to the appropriate enforcement agency.  This committee could serve as a 
mechanism to stave off attack campaigns that contain false and 
misleading information by responding with true and balanced 
information as the judicial candidate is limited in how he can respond.192 
The enforcement arm for ethical violations during judicial elections 
 
 186. Id. at 85. 
 187. Lawyer polls alone can lack the independence of an evaluation that allows more than just 
lawyers to participate. 
 188. Canary, supra note 159, at 85. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. 
 192. ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Cannon 5, (1990). 
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must include both the bench and the bar working in concert to ensure 
that judges and judicial candidates understand that violations will be 
punished.193  An advisory committee could be formed to give advisory 
opinions to judges and candidates during the election period to allow 
them to avoid misconduct.194 The enforcement agency should be 
separate from the monitoring and advisory entities to ensure the integrity 
of the process.  The question may arise why these actions are necessary 
when they are not utilized for other political candidates and the answer 
remains the same as it has been throughout – judges and judicial 
elections are different. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
The principles for implementing the recommendations of the ABA 
Standing Committee for Judicial Independence provide a model 
framework of what campaign reform should be implemented.195  These 
principles, like the ABA findings, identify ten key factors in campaign 
reform in judicial elections.  This plan for campaign reform 
contemplates the implementation of each of these principles. 
Principle 1: “Public financing programs must be sensitive to 
Constitutional limitations on the power of the states to regulate judicial 
campaign reform and financing.”196  Limitations and restrictions that are 
either too restrictive or too broad can face the same constitutional 
impediments. Therefore appropriate limits should be imposed. 
Principle 2: “Public financing programs must tailored by the states 
to fit their specific needs.”197 Given the variations in how judges are 
selected from state to state, one plan will not fit all.  Therefore, while 
nonpartisan elections may appear to be the best alternative for some 
states, the addition of publicly funded campaign funds to the existing 
method of judicial selection may be the best fit.  Some difficulties 
should be anticipated if elections are partisan because of the inherent 
 
 193. Since 2000, the Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee (JEAC) of Florida and the Florida 
Bar teamed together to hold forums in every circuit in which there was a contested judicial election.  
The Board of Governors for the Bar, the Chief judge, political parties, media and any other 
interested parties are invited to the forum.  The disciplinary process of the Bar’s Grievance 
Committee and Judicial Qualifications Committee are explained in great detail. 
 194. In addition, JEAC of Florida formed an Elections Subcommittee issue fast track advisory 
to judges and judicial candidates about their own anticipated conduct.  Violators have been 
subjected to investigation by the Judicial Qualifying Committee (JQC) or the Bar Grievance 
Committee. 
 195. Public Financing of Judicial Campaigns, supra note 143, at 35-56. 
 196. Id. at 35. 
 197. Id. at 38. 
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political nature of partisan races. Public funding in a partisan race may, 
however, resolve the issue of the dependence on partisan money since 
the significance of money should be decreased. Retention races may 
draw the criticism that they unfairly favor the incumbent since no 
opponent appears on the ballot. 
Principle 3: “High court and intermediate appellate judge 
campaigns are best suited for reform.”198  The unique position of judges 
that sit in an appellate capacity makes them ripe for reform.  The limited 
number of judges at this level will result in a lower cost for reform.  
Additionally, the wide variety of selection methods for trial court judges 
makes reform problematic. 
Principle 4: “Adequate and sufficient public financing are keys to 
the success of a public funding program.”199  There must be a 
commitment to publicly funded campaigns that is evidenced by the 
allocation of funds in amounts sufficient to ensure success of the 
program.  There will be no incentive for candidates to participate if 
funding is inadequate. 
Principle 5: “The public financing program should contain 
threshold requirements for qualifying to ensure that frivolous candidates 
are discouraged from participating.”200  The goal of public financing is 
to remove the politics of money but not the politics of hard work from 
judicial campaigns.  Therefore the threshold requirements serve a 
fundamental role in encouraging sincere and meaningful campaigning. 
Principle 6: “Candidate participation should impose limitations on 
contributions.”201  In an attempt to combat the significance of money, 
participation by candidates in publicly funded campaign programs must 
be tied to limitations on campaign contributions. 
Principle 7: “Expenditures should be regulated to include issue 
advocacy spending that is typical among special interest groups.”202  
Regulation of the expenditures of special interest groups in addition to 
the expenditures of candidates and other individuals is as important as 
the limits on campaign contributions. This regulation, however, must 
provide a provision that triggers elimination of the limitations if a 
nonparticipating candidate or special interest group exceeds the 
limitation. 
Principle 8: “Public financing programs should make voter 
 
 198. Id. at 42. 
 199. Id. at 43. 
 200. Public Financing of Judicial Campaigns, supra note 143, at 45. 
 201. Id. at 47. 
 202. Id. at 48. 
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education an integral component.”203 The overriding theme in any 
analysis of reform underscores the need for fair and balanced education 
of the voter about the system in general and about judicial elections in 
particular. 
Principle 9: “The source of funding for public financing reforms 
must be stable.”204  The continuing and sustaining support of publicly 
funded campaigns for judiciary will yield the best probability for 
success.  If funding is erratic, then there will be no incentive for 
candidates to participate in the program since the availability of funds 
could not be assured. 
Principle 10: “The independence of the administration of public 
financing programs fund is of utmost importance.”205  If the 
implementation of public funding in judicial elections falls prey to the 
same political influences that affect the impartiality and independence of 
the judiciary, its success is doomed before it starts. 
 
 203. Id. at 52. 
 204. Public Financing of Judicial Campaigns, supra note 143, at 54. 
 205. Id. at 55. 
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